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This article aims to show Marx’s methodology thought as it is exposed in his 
Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, ordinarily referred as Grundrisse. This 
methodology lies behind his theories of economy and State. The paper examines only the 
parts of the Grundrisse where Marx explicitly writes about methodology and describes how 
his intellectual way is walked. These objective of the paper is to compare Marx’s 
methodology conceptions to the contemporary issues of the systems and complexity 
epistemology. By doing that, the article perceives that in some aspects Marx’s epistemology is 
ahead of its time, working with some conceptions that would be later developed by the 20th 
and 21st centuries epistemology. In other aspects, however, Marx appears as a product of his 
time, and some other conceptions present in his works are now overcame by the development 
of methodology and epistemology thoughts. 
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Introduction 
The Marxism as a political theory and as a guide for an action often overshadows other 
aspects of Marx’s philosophy. One of the interesting aspects is the methodology that Marx 
follows and the epistemology that lies beyond it. Some people commonly understand Marx’s 
method as “true” or “definitive” science, as if it could achieve “real truth”. Others find that 
some kind of definitiveness is impossible in science. Others simply refuse to think about 
Marx’s methodology because they are against Marxist politics. And by remaining on this 
statement, some interesting aspects of Marx’s method that could be related to contemporary 
epistemology are not exposed. 
This article aims to show Marx’s methodology thought as it is exposed in his 
Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, ordinarily referred as Grundrisse. These 
scripts contain preparatory works that would make its final shape in Das Capitol, as much as 
other ideas that would not be published by the living Marx.  
To pursue this objective, this article will examine the parts of the Grundrisse where 
Marx explicitly writes about methodology. The book studied was the Brazilian translation into 
Portuguese made by Mario Duayer and Nélio Schneider, published in 2011 by Boitempo 
Publishing House.24 Also, this paper will make use of Enrique Dussel’s La producción teórica 
de Marx: un comentario a los Grundrisse, in its fourth Mexican edition of 2004.25 
 In the end, the paper will show how Marx’s epistemology incorporates elements of an 
epistemology of complexity based on the theories of systems. This is interesting because the 
theories of systems would develop later, in the twentieth century, but it is noticeable how 
some of the worries of the complexity epistemologies are present in Marx’s work.  
                                                          
24 Marx, Karl. Grundrisse: manuscritos econômicos de 1857-1858; esboços da crítica da economia política. São 
Paulo: Boitempo, 2011 – edição eletrônica. 
25 Dussel, Enrique Domingo. La producción teórica de Marx: un comentario a los Grundrisse. 4 ed. México, 
D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2004 – available at <http://ifil.org/dussel/html/18.html>  





1. The method from reality to abstract determinations and from them to concrete totality: 
One of the biggest problems of human cognition is the relation between our thoughts 
and ours linguistic knowledge, in one side, and reality itself, in the other side. Knowledge is 
always a linguistic thought or a linguistic expression that tries to explain reality. When I want 
to understand the computer I’m working on, I’ll make linguistic sentences about it. These 
linguistic sentences are not the computer itself, but are somehow related to it. When this 
relation match, we say knowledge is true; when it doesn’t, knowledge is false. When this 
relation is comprehended as impossible and the Philosophy conceives real as the 
manifestation of thought itself, this Philosophy is a form of idealism. When this relation is 
comprehended as possible and so the work of the knowledge is to make thought as related to 
real as it is possible, or that reality is a condition of possibility of the thought and the 
understanding, this Philosophy is a form of realism. 
Hence knowledge is always an abstraction of something that can be concrete (this 
computer) or abstract (my thoughts). In a special metaphor, we say that knowledge is above, 
that it rises from the concrete to the abstract. Concrete is in reality, abstraction is in thought. 
But Marx says that the concrete appears in thought as a result, not as a bottom line. He also 
says that, notwithstanding, the concrete is the bottom line of the intuition and the 
representation. And Marx also talks about the method of to ascend from the abstract to the 
concrete.26 What does that mean? 
According to Marx, reality we see is the “real” and “concret” (Realen und 
Konkreten).27 But this reality is different and something that remains out of the representation, 
something exterior, an externality. Representation is an abstraction of reality. As Marx says, 
for example, population or social classes are abstract representations of reality because when 
we think or say “population” we leave unadvised the real people that form real population.28 
Hence “population” is something abstract, in our heads, and not reality itself. So far we have 
two different things: reality (concrete) and the representation (abstract).  
This representation is chaotic because it is not yet simplified by abstract concepts. The 
next step in knowledge is to take this representation and work in abstraction and analysis, 
separating the different parts of the representation and taking each one of them as a whole. 
Now we have determinations.29 Hence from concrete to representation and from 
representation to determinations there are three steps in Marx’s method. But only this second 
movement, from representations to determinations, is really theory, because representation 
itself is the pre-scientific knowledge, common sense.30 Also it is scientific knowledge because 
it should be able to explain why some thing is as it is. To explain what are the relations that 
determines the phenomenons. This is why this knowledge is not only description, but also 
explanation: it explains what makes a thing be the way it is.31  
These multiple determinations, each one a part but taken as a whole to be 
comprehended, are then understood in the totality. To Marx, this fourth step is the 
achievement of the concrete totality. And it is also an ascension from abstract 
(determinations) to concrete (totality). This is the dialectic method: the knowledge of putting 
the part in a totality. The movement from step three (determinations) to four (concrete totality) 
                                                          
26 “...o concreto aparece no pensamento como processo da síntese, como resultado, não como ponto de partida, 
não obstante seja o ponto de partida efetivo e, em consequência, também o ponto de partida da intuição e da 
representação... método de ascender do abstrato ao concreto” (MARX, op. cit., p. 95). 
27 Dussel, op. cit., p. 49. 
28 Marx, op. cit., p. 93-94. 
29 Dussel, op. cit., p. 51. 
30 Dussel, op. cit., p. 51. 
31 Cardoso, Miriam Limoeiro. Para uma leitura do método em Karl Marx: anotações sobre a “Introdução” de 
1857. Cadernos do Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Filosofia da Universidade Federal Fluminense. Rio de 
Janeiro, n. 30, set/1990, p. 20-21. 




is the dialectic act.32 And why this totality, even if it is a thought, is “concrete”? Marx 
explains: “Concrete is concrete because it is the synthesis of multiple determinations, hence, 
unity of diversity”.33 
Now we can understand why Marx says that the concrete appear in thought as a result 
of the synthesis procedure. In the first movement of theory (in fact the second movement of 
knowledge), representation is volatilized in an abstract determination; in the second 
movement of theory (the third of knowledge), abstract determinations take to the reproduction 
of the concrete in the through the spirit.34 
 In this fourth plan, of concrete totality, the single determinations are combined. Dussel 
explains this process with these words: 
Lo simple es p.ej. la producción (determinación que puede por su parte ser descrita en 
sus determinaciones esenciales en sí). Pero al ir elaborando las relaciones mutuamente 
constitutivas de la producción con el consumo primero, con la distribución posteriormente, y 
por último con el intercambio, se construyó así un todo donde las cuatro determinaciones 
constituían una nueva totalidad con mutuas codeterminaciones.35  
Of course this concrete totality is a work of thought and lives in the spirit. Marx is 
aware of that, but he says this is the only way thought can appropriate reality. Most important, 
to Marx those concepts that form concrete totality are not a product from concepts themselves, 
like concepts generating concepts, lying above intuition and representation. They are a 
product of the elaboration of intuition and representation in concepts. It is possible because of 
this that Marx says that this procedure is different from art, religion and mental-practical: it 
maintains a connection with the intuition of reality.36 So we could say this is a form of 
empirism: even if science begins in the abstract, with the determinations made from the 
representations, thought begins with representations that are made from reality. 
According to Enrique Dussel’s explanation, this dialectic construction is a double 
movement. First, it takes the determinations (abstract concepts created by the scientist) and 
relates one to each other, like the relation between production and consume. Production 
defines consume and consume defines production, so the opposed co-determines each other. 
Second, these opposed form a new autonomous totality. A unity formed by oppositions. The 
simple (determinations) forms now a complex (totality).37  
Marx sees his method as better than the way other economists worked before him, 
because he doesn’t take that representation as reality itself. Differently, he knows that the 
chaotic representation is not the concrete reality, so he cannot work with it. He must know the 
determinations in an abstraction work and then conceive the concrete totality, a conceptual 
world that comprehends the determinations that form the concrete, a quality not present in the 
chaotic representation. To Marx, true science is made when we work with this concrete 
totality that maintains a connection with reality, once it was created working with the 
determinations and the representations of reality. So concepts depend on reality and reality is 
prior to thought. According to Miriam Limoeiro Cardoso, in Marx’s Philosophy the concrete 
reality preexists, underlies and subsists to thought. 
In Marx’s thinking, this way from simplicity (abstract determinations) to complexity 
(concrete totality), which he regards as an “elevation”, corresponds to history, where more 
                                                          
32 Dussel, op. cit., p. 52. 
33 “O concreto é concreto porque é a síntese de múltiplas determinações, portanto, unidade da diversidade” 
(Marx, op. cit., p. 95). 
34 Marx, op. cit., p. 95. 
35 Op. cit., p. 52-53. A free translation to English could be this: “The simple is, for example, the production (a 
determination which can be described in its essential determinations). But the process of elaborating the mutually 
constitutive relations between production with consume first, with distribution next and at last with exchange, 
constructs a whole where the four determinations constitutes a new totality with mutual codeterminations”. 
36 Marx, op. cit., p. 96. 
37 Op. cit., p. 53. 




simple realities develop to become more complex. There would be a match between reality 
and thought.38  
Also, Marx thinks about the categories as abstract and general, valid to all times, but as 
product of historic relations and full valid only to these relations and in its interior.39 It is like 
this because the modern categories are more complex and can be compared to ancient 
categories. The category “work” in the bourgeois society is more complex than in ancient 
societies, so it can be used to describe and understand these ancient societies and what work 
meant there. But this use must be made being aware that there are differences between 
modern world and the previous societies. Bourgeois society is different from others and we 
should not see bourgeois society in these ancient ones, although the categories stay useful to 
compare and understand reality in its historical difference. And this method will be productive 
when the modern society is capable of self-criticism, not comprehending itself as a superior 
and infallible development of ancient societies.40 
 
Marx’s method and the contemporary systems and complexity epistemology: 
In this point we can make a partial balance of Marx methodology and try to understand 
the epistemology that supports it. We can compare it with the contemporary epistemology 
issues regarded to the opposition between the classic method of reductionism of the 19th 
Century and the needs of an systemic and complex scientific knowledge.41 
First, is noticeable that Marx is worried with the connection between the science’s 
abstract propositions and the concrete reality. Marx can be understood as an empirist here. In 
these methodology scripts, he refuses to create a world of concepts that would be sufficient to 
science and that would go without reality. This methodology can be read as a partial reaction 
to German idealism that came before Marx, mainly Hegel, with who Marx seems to dialogue 
assuming some parts of his Philosophy but repelling others. It could have an ancient reference 
in Francis Bacon’s epistemological ideas. Contemporary epistemology seems to keep working 
with empirism, although overcoming the logical positivism of the beginning of the 20th 
century. 
On the other hand, it is possible to identify confusion between reality and the 
metalanguage that describes it. It is noticeable when Marx calls “categories” the abstract 
concepts but also the reality itself. Also, it is noticeable when he says that the subject exists in 
reality as well as in the head, hence the categories express forms of being.42 But it is also 
possible to understand this identification as a result of the way down, descending from 
thought to reality, as a step beyond concrete totality. Concrete totality is abstract when 
compared, for example, with bourgeois society. It is a further level of cognition when we 
examine modern society with the cognition we developed from representation to concrete 
totality. 
                                                          
38 Op. cit., p. 98. 
39 Op. cit., p. 102. 
40 Op. cit., p. 103-104. 
41 For these systemic and complex epistemology issues, it is important the reading of Capra, Fritjof. The hidden 
connections: integrating the biological, cognitive, and social dimensions of life into a science of sustainability. 
New York: Doubleday, 2002; The turning point: science, society and the rising culture. New York: Bantam 
Books, 1988; The web of life: a new scientific understanding of living systems. New York: Doubleday, 1997; Le 
Moigne, Jean‐louis. The intelligence of complexity: Do the ethical aims of research and intervention in education 
and training not lead us to a “New discourse on the study of our time”? In: Sísifo: Education Sciences Journal. 
Avaliable at http://sisifo.fpce.ul.pt/pdfs/13-Conf1EN.pdf; Montuori, Alfonso. Complexity, epistemology and the 
challenge of the future. Available at http://www.academia.edu/1425652/ 
Complexity_Epistemology_and_the_Challenge_of_the_Future; Delattre, Pierre. Teoria dos sistemas e 
epistemologia. Porto: Sousa Martins, 1981; Morin, Edgar. Restricted complexity, general complexity. Available 
at http://www.pensamientocomplejo.com.ar/docs/files/Edgar%20Morin,%20Restricted%20Complexi 
ty,%20General%20Complexity.pdf. 
42 Op. cit., p. 104. 




Second, is perceptible how Marx does not create only linear cause-effect chains of 
concepts. One of the greatest perceptions of contemporary theories of systems and complexity 
is that the multiple elements of reality are connected and influencing each other. Hence we 
can say that what sometimes is a cause of an effect is affected by this effect as well, in a way 
that this effect becomes a cause of an effect in the prior cause. Marx conceives a partially 
systemic and complex relation between some determinations that co-determinates each one 
another. For example, production determines consume and is determined by consume, as well 
as consume determines production and is determined by it. There is here something that can 
be related to the systemic theory that would be developed later, where a system is a totality 
formed by elements in interaction. But Marx stops here, not going on. It is somehow a step 
into complexity made by Marx. 
Third, Marx method can be interpreted as if the determinations could be understood 
first on their own and then, in a second moment, integrated in totality, where new 
determinations appear co-determining each other. It is a method that assumes the possibility to 
know a part aside from totality and then, later, to insert that part in totality generating a wider 
knowledge. There is here something that can also be related to the systemic theory, but now as 
an idea that would be overcomed by the complexity epistemology. The theories of systems 
and complexity often claim that it is sometimes impossible to know parts of reality without 
the vision of the whole totality. This totality cannot just be thought later, because it determines 
the parts, that have some emergent characteristics only present when understood as parts of a 
totality. 
Fourth, reality preexisting thought is another problem. This precedence may be often 
chronological, but the contact with reality is already conditioned by the existence, which, in 
an ontological sense, preexists the objects and the representations. Some theories of 
complexity assume existentialism philosophies such as Heidegger’s and Sartre’s 
 
Conclusion 
Karl Marx exposes some of his methodology conceptions in his Grundrisse. These 
conceptions can be compared to the contemporary issues of the systems and complexity 
epistemology. When we do that, we can perceive that in some aspects Marx’s epistemology is 
ahead of its time, working with some conceptions that would be later developed by the 20th 
and 21st centuries epistemology. In other aspects, however, Marx appears as a product of his 
time, and some other conceptions present in his works are now overcame by the development 
of methodology and epistemology thoughts. 
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